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How Occupied France Financed Its Own Exploitation in World War II
By Filippo Occhino, Kim Oosterlinck, and Eugene N. White * Can a vanquished country deliver significant resources to its occupier? Based on the failure of Germany to pay its post-World War I reparations, conventional wisdom generally doubts the possibility. Yet, German reparations represent the exception rather than the rule. Perhaps, the most successful case was the transfer of resources that Germany obtained from France during World War II. Although they imposed huge payments, the victors left the French to decide how to raise the funds. After comparing the magnitude of France's payment to other episodes, we employ a neoclassical growth model to assess both wartime and postwar policies. The burden imposed on the French economy caused it to shrink at a rapid pace, curtailing consumption and yielding large debt and money overhangs. Although Vichy intended to manage the postwar debt burden with higher tax rates, the governments following Liberation allowed inflation to slash the debt, redistributing the adjustment cost. Higher taxes did not fund the debt but instead paid for expenditures associated with the rise of the welfare state.
I. Occupation Payments
During World War II, the French economy became a vital part of the German war machine. Even though measures of GDP are fragile and underestimates because of the substantial black market (20 to 30% of GDP), the total occupation payments extracted by the Nazis is stunning, rising from 20 to 50% official GDP between 1940 and 1943 (Milward, 1970; Occhino, Oosterlinck and White, 2006 Germany of 120 billion francs, it was modest relative to the occupation indemnity. The Banque de France was compelled to credit the account of occupation authorities with 20 million Reichsmarks or 400 million francs per day, yielding a rapid monetary expansion.
After continued German victories, daily credits were cut to 15 million Reichsmarks or 300 million francs. This moderation ended when Blitzkrieg failed to deliver the Soviet Union to the Reich, forcing a complete mobilization of Germany and its satellites for war.
The occupation costs, including bilateral trade credits, produced inflationary pressure as the German authorities purchased weapons and other goods. Although allowed considerable policy discretion, Vichy's finance ministers did not seek to undermine the German exactions and believed that an accommodating French government would be less onerous than direct German administration. To reduce the growing stock of currency, Vichy introduced a policy (the politique de circuit) to "close the circuit" by selling bonds to repay the Banque de France. Bonds were promoted with public campaigns, banks were forced to buy them, and the capital markets were squeezed.
To keep the cost of financing low, the Banque de France pegged the price of long-term bonds to have an approximate yield of 3%. In addition, taxes were raised and collection procedures were improved. Wage and price controls, introduced in 1939, were strengthened; and real wages fell far below their pre-war level. Controls led to shortages, rationing and a thriving black market. 
II. A Model of Occupation Payments
To assess Vichy's strategy to pay for occupation, we extend Ohanian's (1997) and McGrattan and Ohanian's (2003) basic neoclassical model of a wartime economy to include money, wages and price controls, and a stabilization program. In the model, identical, infinitely-lived households own competitive firms that produce a single non-durable good. Households are endowed with one unit of time per period, which can be spent for leisure l t or labor n t . The household lifetime utility function is:
which depends on consumption c t , real cash balances M t+1 /P t , and leisure l t. For the period utility function u, we adopt the functional form:
The last term becomes Ψ ln(l t ) when the labor supply elasticity η takes the value of one. where τ nt , τ kt , τ bt , and T t are tax rates on labor, capital and bonds and lump-sum taxes.
Firms rent labor and capital, and produce consumption and investment goods with the Cobb-Douglas production function:
where the labor-augmenting technology A t grows at the constant rate. Firms act competitively to maximize profits Z t = P t y t -W t n t -Q t k t .
The government budget constraint is:
(5) P t g t + (1+r t ) B t = τ nt W t n t + τ kt Q t k t + τ bt r t B t + T t + B t+1 + M t+1 -M t . 5
A competitive equilibrium is a set of sequences of quantities and prices such that:
given prices, households and firms solve their optimization problems; the government's period budget constraints are satisfied; and the labor, capital, goods and bonds markets clear. By setting wage and price controls, the government determined the real wage, leaving households to decide on how much labor to supply. To model the wage controls imposed during the war, we then consider an alternative equilibrium, characterized by the share, λ, of the economy subject to wage and price controls. In each war year, the real wage is set equal to a weighted average of the exogenously controlled wage and the competitive market wage. While labor supply is determined by the households, labor demand is set by firms subject to a wartime rationing constraint, requiring their labor demand not to be larger than average (per firm) labor supply.
To solve the model, we use the shooting algorithm (Ljunqvist and Sargent, 2004) .
The steady state of the model approximates the pre-World War I averages of a 2% real GDP growth rate, a 4% real interest rate, a 10% ratio of government expenditures to GDP, 11% tax rates, a ratio of debt to GDP of 80%, and a ratio of M2 to GDP of 40% (See Occhino, Oosterlinck, and White, 2006 for the data sources.) Although not explicitly modeled, the steady state exchange rate regime should be a gold standard, approximated by setting net exports (exogenously controlled by the Nazis) and inflation equal to zero. The values for the labor drafted to Germany, tax rates, lump-sum taxes, government expenditure, net exports and money supply are treated as exogenously determined and matched with data during the War, as are the initial values for capital, bonds and money.
An explicit stabilization policy is required by our model, otherwise an immediate return to steady state policies would cause the debt to grow explosively because the surplus is insufficient to cover war-generated interest payments. To measure the size of the stabilization package required to move the economy back to its steady state path, we assume that lump-sum taxes are levied and money is withdrawn so that debt and money return to their steady state levels at the end of a five-year period, which approximates the post-World War I stabilization plans for Britain and France.
IV. An Assessment of Wartime Finance Figure 1 shows the behavior in our model of output, consumption, debt and money, normalizing so that the steady state output is one; other variables are presented relative to this benchmark. The dotted lines represent the steady state growth path for each variable and the starred lines the path of the observed variable, where it was available. The behavior of the real sector with a competitive labor market is shown by a dashed line and by a solid line for a labor market subject to wage and price controls. It should be noted that the collapse of output is less than the decline officially recorded, as the data does not include black market activity.
Debt and money begin at their sustainable steady state ratios of 0.864 and 0.40.
During the war, the debt to income ratio and real money climbed as part of the efforts of Vichy to finance the war. The closeness of our estimates is surprising since our model has a non-distortionary stabilization program in contrast to the postwar inflationary policies. The calibrated real money, velocity and debt track the realized values though inflation is below the observed rate. Given the large accumulated occupation debt, the five year stabilization program of lump sum taxes that was needed to bring the end-ofwar debt down to the sustainable debt to GDP level was equal to 97% of steady state 
